Public administration in Bangladesh by Jahan, Ferdous
  
 
 
 
CGS Working Paper  
CGS WP 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Public Administration in Bangladesh 
 
       Ferdous Jahan 
 
 
 
                               Background Paper 
                                          for 
            The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006
 
                       Produced in Collaboration 
                                         with 
           Research and Evaluation Division (RED) BRAC  
 
           Centre for Governance Studies  
        BRAC University 
         Dhaka, Bangladesh 
 
        www.cgs-bu.com 
  
 
 
 
 
The Centre for Governance Studies at BRAC University seeks to foster a new 
generation of researchers, public administrators and citizens with critical and 
analytical perspectives on governance.  
 
The Centre’s State of Governance research project is devoted to providing empirical 
evidence and conceptual clarity about governance in Bangladesh. It seeks to 
demystify a contentious topic to further constructive discussion and debate. 
 
Good governance is often viewed as a means of advancing the agendas of official and 
multilateral development institutions. The Centre believes, however, that there is a 
large domestic constituency for good governance; and that governance is properly 
deliberated between citizens and their state rather than by the state and external 
institutions. The Centre’s working papers are a means of stimulating domestic 
discourse on governance in Bangladesh. They bring to the public domain the insights 
and analyses of the new generation of researchers. 
 
The initial working papers were originally developed as contributions and background 
papers for The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006, the Centre’s first annual 
report.   
 
David Skully, 
Editor, CGS Working Paper Series  
Visiting Professor CGS-BRAC University and Fulbright Scholar 
 
Center for Governance Studies Working Paper Series 
 
CGS WP 1 Ferdous Jahan: Public Administration in Bangladesh 
CGS WP 2 Nicola Banks: A Tale of Two Wards 
CGS WP 3 Irum Shehreen Ali: Governance and the Media 
 
 
Research and Evaluation Division (RED) of BRAC was set up in 1975 as an 
independent entity within the framework of BRAC. The main mission of RED is to 
provide research, evaluation and analytical support to BRAC’s development 
programmes. RED also carries out research on issues of national development 
importance, often in partnership with other national and international institutions and 
networks. The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 is yet another research 
partnership that RED is proud to be involved with in partnership with BRAC 
University’s Center for Governance Studies. 
 
All research outputs of RED are available in its website www.bracresearch.org and in 
hard copies from Ayesha Abed Library, BRAC University, Aarong House, 65 
Mohakhali C/A, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Public Administration in Bangladesh 
 
Ferdous Jahan 
 
Assistant Professor  
Department of Public Administration  
University of Dhaka 
 
Program Coordinator  
Master of Development Studies  
Development Studies Program, BRAC University 
 
jahan@bracuniversity.ac.bd 
jahan@sas.upenn.edu 
 
December 2006 
 
Abstract The paper examines the structure, reforms and challenges of the 
contemporary Bangladesh Civil Service. It provides an overview of the public 
administration system; an evaluation of reforms and innovations that have been 
“allowed”; the present recruitment procedure; and the extent and impact of 
politicization. Recruitment and politicization are the key problems identified and 
discussed. To explore these problems further we conducted qualitative, interview-
based primary research with recent university graduates, and entry-level, mid-career 
and retired civil servants. The second part of the paper reports the analysis of the 
survey data 
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Public Administration in Bangladesh 
 
Introduction 
 
Bangladesh bears a colonial legacy in its entire public administration system. Present 
day Bangladesh was part of the British Empire for almost two hundred years. In 1947 
Pakistani rulers replaced the British and dominated the area then known as East 
Pakistan until a bitter war in 1971 brought about an independent Bangladesh. A 
colonial imprint persists in Bangladesh especially in political and administrative 
arrangements. The British tradition helped the bureaucracy to become an essential 
tool of governance. At the same time, it is accused of following the “Pakistani 
tradition of involvement in power politics” (Haque, 1995). 
 
The political system of Bangladesh has survived a series of transitions. A few years of 
democracy were followed by nearly fifteen years of military rule. In 1990, for the first 
time, Bangladesh achieved a fully functioning democratic structure. Ironically, the 
nature and role of bureaucracy in both the pre and post-democratic period remained 
almost the same except for an increase in number of ministries, divisions, departments 
and statutory bodies (Ahmed, 2002: 323-26). 
 
The role of government has changed in the course of Bangladesh’s development. 
After independence its focus was the attainment of development in all spheres of life 
by intervention and the use of administration in a constructive way. Government and 
administration were seen not merely as a regulator but as a facilitator. However, it can 
be argued that development, when considered as a multi-dimensional concept, cannot 
be attained and sustained without good governance. The term “good governance” has 
acquired tremendous importance in the contemporary world, especially in the context 
of the developing countries. For example, many developing countries have prepared 
their own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Good governance an essential 
component in implementing the plans and strategies to achieve the targets set forth by 
PRSP; but good governance is a component that most developing countries seriously 
lack.  
 
Merilee S. Grindle points out that when determining their priorities and taking steps to 
ensure good governance, most developing countries go too far: they chalk out a plan 
or strategy far beyond the limited capacity of the institutions charged with 
implementation responsibilities. Grindle suggests redefining “Good Governance” as 
“Good Enough Governance”, that is, “a condition of minimally acceptable 
government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly 
hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction 
initiatives to go forward” (Grindle, 2004: 526).  
 
In Bangladesh, a second-generation development challenge is to achieve “good 
enough governance”. No matter how much a government tries, success will not be 
attained if it lacks competent institutions to implement policies. Public administration 
is the key institution for policy implementation. If it is not functioning well, then 
PRSP targets are unlikely to be met. The state has to make sure that its administrative 
apparatus is functioning well, so that it can innovate and implement solutions and that 
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it can ensure that the poor will not be excluded from the process and benefits of 
development. 
 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the role of government has changed from an 
intervener to a referee; instead of playing the game, its main duty is to make sure that 
a fair game is being played. This reinvented role of the government necessitates 
redefining the role of the bureaucracy.  
 
Bureaucracy can be considered as an “open” system that interacts with or is affected 
by the environment in which it operates. Traditionally, this environment consisted of 
only the “domestic economic, political and social context within which the 
organization is located.” Now, however, “public organizations are more often faced 
with global threats and opportunities that affect their operations and perspectives” 
(Welch and Wong, 2001: 372-73). The performance of a public organization depends 
largely on how the domestic political institution handles global pressures as well as 
how it interacts with the bureaucracy. In a country like Bangladesh, where global 
pressure is eminent and the domestic political institutions are ill structured, the 
colonial legacy places the bureaucracy in a difficult position. As globalization or 
market liberalization changes both the domestic context and the functioning of the 
bureaucracy, it is possible—but not necessarily desirable—that the two primary state 
institutions, politics and bureaucracy, forge an alliance. 
 
Rationale of the Present Study  
 
There is a common perception that civil servants all over the world are more or less 
apathetic to the needs of the people and that they are even unwilling to listen to them. 
According to Alkadry, two major reasons account for bureaucrats’ “inability to take 
action.” First, a bureaucracy is a formal, rule-base organization design to limit the 
discretion and bound the initiative and empowerment of individual bureaucrats. 
Second, there is the “bureaucratic experience.” A bureaucrat is subject to a 
combination of conflicting social, political and other pressures; the bureaucrat learns 
to contend with these pressures by internalizing organizational norms and avoiding 
risks. (Alkadry, 2003: 184-88). The situation is no different in Bangladesh; indeed, it 
may be even worse because an inadequate, faulty recruitment procedure can place a 
non-qualified person in a formalized organization; and because politicization—the 
priority of party loyalty—can amplify the pressures a bureaucrat already feels.  
 
These two problems—the defective recruitment procedure and the politicization of the 
civil service—may be largely responsible for the lack of “good enough governance” 
in Bangladesh. If recruitment is not fair and competitive, it fails to attract the 
meritorious and appropriate candidates. It becomes impossible to create a civil service 
that can handle the global pressures and the challenges imposed by the private sector; 
and it will be difficult for the nation to have an efficient, innovative and dynamic civil 
service. Politicization may cause a decline in the morale of the civil servants and 
reduce their efficiency and effectiveness. Faulty recruitment and politicization may 
create a vicious cycle: because of politicization fewer interested, meritorious 
candidates enter the civil service; with fewer meritorious new entrants, the scope for 
politicization increases; and this further deters the most able candidates from entering 
the civil service. Eventually this process could corrupt the entire administration. 
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Recruitment and politicization are the two important challenges of public 
administration explored in this paper. To explore these problems we conducted 
qualitative, interview-based primary research. We interviewed 5 members of the Civil 
Service of Pakistan1, 15 mid-level and 20 fresh BCS officers and 50 recent graduates 
of public and private universities. For the purpose of the study, we consider mid-level 
civil servants as those who have been in the civil service for more than 5 years and 
hold a rank no higher than deputy secretary. Fresh civil servants are defined as those 
with not more than 5 years experience. 
 
This paper has two parts. The first part contains an overview of the public 
administration system of Bangladesh: its structure; an evaluation of the citizen-
oriented service delivery system and innovations that have been “allowed”; the 
present recruitment procedure; and the extent and impact of politicization. The second 
part presents the analysis of our primary research data and findings. 
 
I   The Bangladesh Civil Service: Structure, Reforms and Challenges  
                                                                                                                                                
The Structure of Bangladesh Civil Service 
 
The government of Bangladesh has a two-tier administrative system. The upper tier is 
the central secretariat at the national level consisting of the ministries and divisions to 
provide policies and to perform clearinghouse functions. The other tier consists of 
‘line’ departments/directorates attached to the ministries and divisions that are mainly 
responsible for general administration, service delivery to citizens and implementation 
of various government development programs at the sub-national level. (Ahmed, 
2002: 327). 
 
At present, the Bangladesh civil service has more than one million civil servants in 37 
ministries, 11 divisions, 254 departments and 173 statutory bodies (ADB, 2005). The 
internal organization structure of a ministry reflects a hierarchical order. A minister is 
in charge of a ministry and is normally the “political head” of that ministry. A 
ministry consists of at least one division. A secretary or, in his absence an additional 
secretary, is considered the “administrative head” of the ministry. He/she conducts 
and looks after the duties of a division, which includes routine operation, supervision 
of its staffing and organizational processes. He/she is also the adviser to the minister 
regarding policy and administrative issues. A division can further be divided into 
wings. A joint secretary is the head of a wing and has the power to submit cases 
directly to the minister for decisions. In practice, such cases are first submitted to the 
secretary/additional secretary for his consideration before being placed before the 
minister. A wing is composed of branches. The head of a wing—a joint secretary—
supervises the activities of the branches within his wing. Each branch is under the 
charge of a deputy secretary. Below the branch is the section. Headed by an assistant 
secretary, it is the basic working unit of a division. An assistant secretary disposes all 
                                                 
1 A civil servant’s batch—the year one enters the civil service—is central to his or her professional 
identity.  Bangladeshi civil servants who entered the civil service prior to 1971 were recruited and 
trained in the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). The CSP was unapologetically elitist and the new 
Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) was less selective and less elitist. Although serving in the Bangladesh 
Civil Service, these CSP-trained officers emphasize this distinction by exhibiting their CSP pedigree. 
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cases based on clear precedents. Below the level of assistant secretary, there are a 
considerable number of office personnel (Zafarullah, 1998: 83-87). 
 
Departments are also attached to each ministry/division. The departments determine 
the blueprint for implementing various decisions taken by the ministry/division by 
providing technical information and advice. Who heads these departments or 
directorates depends on their importance. In some cases, an officer enjoying the pay 
grades and benefits of a secretary heads a department while on the other cases it is 
headed by an official enjoying the pay grade and benefits of a deputy secretary, joint 
secretary or an additional secretary (Ahmed, 2002: 329). 
 
There are four classes in Bangladesh civil service. Class I and part of class II officers 
are treated as “gazetted” officers; the rest are considered as “non-gazetted” officers 
(Ahmed, 2002: 334).  The number of Class 1 officers is about 40,000. Of them 70% 
are recruited into 29 cadres; the rest do not belong to a particular cadre but work in 
functional areas. Recruitment is conducted by the Public Service Commission (PSC) 
as per requirement conveyed by the Ministry of Establishment, which is responsible 
for the personnel policy within the civil service and human resources function, 
particularly in the administrative cadre (DFID, 2004). 
Citizen-Oriented Services 
The evaluation of citizen-oriented services depends both on the role and performance 
of the service providers—the public servants—and also on the satisfaction of service 
recipients—the citizens. The government provides a variety of services and its service 
portfolio has changed with development. With rapid nationalization after 
independence, Bangladesh adopted an interventionist state-centered model of 
development. Although the government began to shift from that model after 1975, it 
continued to exercise considerable control over the major socio-economic sectors—
education, health, transport, communication, etc. During the early 1990s, the 
government shifted from a state-centered to a more market-led approach. Under 
constant pressure from development partners, the government is trying to emulate 
business ethics such as effectiveness, decentralization, competition, efficiency, value-
for-money, and partnership in public services.  
 
Based on the principle of consumer or user rights, citizens are now supposed to be 
treated as customers. The government, instead of playing an interventionist role in 
various sectors, is advised to redefine its role and to transform itself into a catalyst of 
private investors and business institutions (Haque, 2001: 99-103). However, being 
one of the poorest countries of the world and with a malfunctioning market, the 
government still has to play an important role in various sectors. In the energy sector, 
the government provides its service through Bangladesh Power Development Board 
(BPDB), Rural Electricity Board (REB), and Petrobangla. For transportation there is 
Bangladesh Road and Transport Corporation (BRTC); for Telecommunication sector 
it is Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph Board (BTTB); and for health sector, the 
government renders service through its local government bodies, City Corporations 
and Municipalities (DFID, 2004). In recent years, the government has undergone 
many restructuring programs to increase the ability, efficiency and quality of the 
service and to downsize these agencies.  
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Despite these reform efforts the citizen’s perception of the public servants and the 
quality of the service they provide is negative. Various surveys indicate that citizens 
consider the public service as “over centralized, unaccountable, inefficient, overpaid, 
coercive, unethical, and rent seeking” (Zafarullah, 1997). The country’s bureaucratic 
efficiency is rated at 4.7 on a 0 to 10 scale (10=best) (Mukherjee et al., 2001). 
Individual encounters with officials brought “unnecessary harassment, procrastination 
in deciding simple problems, discourteous and arrogant behavior, keeping customers 
waiting for hours before attending to their needs, frequent absence from office, not 
maintaining appointments, ignoring pleas for reconsideration of a problem, unwilling 
to correct mistakes, and making unabashed approaches for pecuniary benefits” 
(Zafarullah, 1997).  
According to the World Bank, on an ascending five point scale, the level of public 
satisfaction with health care is 3.1 for the public health system (3.8 for private health 
care); 3.5 for government schools (3.8 for private schools). In urban areas, 60% of 
people are dissatisfied with electricity supplies whereas in rural areas dissatisfaction is 
40%. In the case of the telecommunication system, the rate of faults per 100 telephone 
lines per month is about 49 (World Bank, 1996). Corruption is a part of service 
delivery by the public sector. A Transparency International survey finds that the 
police sector is the most corrupt: 97% of households completely or generally agree 
that it is just about impossible to get help from the police without influence or bribe. 
For getting an electricity connection, 33% households had to pay bribe. For getting 
their children in school, 74% households had to use “extra-regular” methods 
(Mukherjee et al., 2001). 
From the above statistics, it is evident that, in general, people are dissatisfied with the 
quality of the service they receive and the performance of the public servants 
rendering these services is subject of much criticism. Undoubtedly, the government 
will undertake more reforms to downsize, restructure and increase the efficiency of 
public servants. The government faces a competitive market in which citizens are 
more conscious about their rights. The major challenge for the government will be to 
cope up with this situation. It will be interesting to see how the government will face 
the constant pressure imposed by its development partners and, at the same time, 
ensure access to resources for the poorest of the poor. 
So far, the studies conducted in this context focus only on the perception of citizens 
about public servants and the quality of services they are providing. No study has 
been done to measure the level of efficiency of the service providers or the 
expectations of the citizens: What does citizen-oriented service mean to citizens? 
What do they expect from the government and what are their expectations from the 
public servants? At present, citizens in many cases are paying bribes but they are 
likely to be willing to pay the same sum as a service fee if the government were to 
improve the quality of services or if service provision were outsourced to private 
vendors. All these issues deserve further systematic investigation.   
Innovation in the Bangladesh Civil Service 
 
Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is generally considered as a closed system, which tries to 
resist change. Every administrative reform committee has tried to introduce 
substantive reforms and suggested innovations. For example, the last administrative 
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reform committee, the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC), proposed 
the preparation of performance standards and a citizen’s charter for three ministries 
and five important organizations; the constitution of three clusters of closely related 
ministries—general, economic and socio-political infrastructure; and the creation of 
three public service commissions—one for general services, another for technical 
services and a third for education services. It is to be noted that none of these 
recommendations has been implemented (Report of Public Administration Reform 
Commission, 2000). However, some innovations in public administration have been 
successfully implemented recently. 
 
One Stop Utility Bill Payment System 
 
The PARC proposed allowing the payment of all public utility bills at one place at a 
one time instead of several payments at different times and places. In 2003, the 
government introduced the "One Stop Utility Bill Payment System" to remove the 
hassle, waste of time and harassment of subscribers. Normally subscribers had to pay 
bills for four utility services—telephone, power, gas and water—to separate banks, 
running between branches and waiting in long queues for hours. Under the present 
system, a subscriber can pay all utility service bills at one bank (The Daily Star, 
September 13, 2003).  
Introduction of e-Governance: 
PARC recommended introducing e-governance. The activities of various ministries 
have already been computerized. A Ministry of Science and Technology was created. 
Websites containing important information for several ministries were launched. 
Ministry of Finance developed software for budget planning, sensitivity and impact 
analysis. Ministry of Communication created a database containing information about 
contractors and tenders. It also created a project monitoring system for tracking project 
progress. The achievement of Bangladesh Planning Commission, in this case, is 
noteworthy. It has a file sharing system through a Local Area Network (LAN), the 
capability for video- conferencing, and it maintains a digital library. It has also created 
software for interfacing between development and revenue budgets (Chowdhury and 
Taifur, 2003: 5).  
 
The Reform Experience of LGED 
 
The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) adopted a participatory 
approach in designing its local public works projects. In order to determine the 
location of rural road works and to establish the local markets, the LGED actively 
solicits the input of local groups. It turns out that in many cases the LGED engineers 
are persuaded to change plans and priorities based on local consultations (Mukherjee 
et al., 2001). A development partner proposed this participatory approach.  
 
Administrative Reform Efforts 
 
As noted in the introduction, Bangladesh inherited an archaic and colonial 
administrative structure. The performance of the bureaucracy has never been beyond 
question (Khan and Zafarullah, 1985: 45-46). To meet the demands of a changing 
society, government tried to reform the administrative system. Successive 
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governments appointed as many as fifteen administrative reform commissions and 
committees. Each tried to change the administrative system to make it more dynamic, 
efficient and representative. Two of them, Administrative and Services and 
Reorganization Commission (ASRC) and Committee for Administrative Reform and 
Reorganization (CARR) went beyond “the domain of the traditional administrative 
system and pleaded for democratization of administration and devolution of power to 
elected local governments”. However, most of the recommendations of the reform 
committees were never implemented; in a few cases, the recommendations were 
implemented in a modified form (Ahmed, 2002: 336-37).  
 
The literature on administrative reform suggests that the reform efforts are 
unsuccessful mainly because of the lack of commitment of the government and the 
strong resistance posed by civil servants. Most of these reform efforts tried to provide 
technical solutions and neglected the socio-political dimensions (World Bank, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the recommendations made by the Pay and Services Commission in 
1977 brought some significant changes in the civil service system. For example, it led 
to the creation of 28 class I services under 14 main cadres in 1981 and constitution of 
an apex service, the Senior Services Pool, which was abolished in 1989.  
 
The reform efforts by the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) are 
clearly influenced by the New Public Management movement. PARC provided some 
innovative ideas, submitting 70 short-term and 37 long-term recommendations. 
Considering citizens as customers, the commission urged, among other things, the 
improvement of public service delivery, reform and downsizing of the civil service, 
taking measures to combat corruption, among others (GoB, 2000). However, only a 
few of these recommendations have been implemented so far and in reality things 
stand more or less where they started. 
 
On the poverty reduction front, the government considers good governance as an 
important prerequisite. In 2005, Bangladesh prepared its own poverty reduction 
strategy paper [PRSP], called, “Bangladesh, Unlocking the Future, National Strategy 
for Accelerated Poverty Reduction”. Good governance, including “improving 
implementation capacity, promoting local governance, tackling corruption, enhancing 
access to justice for the poor, and improving sectoral governance”, has been deemed 
as one of the PRSP’s “policy priorities.” Due importance is also given to improving 
service delivery and enhancing implementation capacity.  
 
Implementation has proved to be the bane of policy and programme 
initiatives on poverty reduction. A sharper engagement with implementation 
challenges is a critical necessity for accelerated poverty reduction. Four 
challenges merit priority attention: freeing the annual development 
programme (ADP) from the consistent burden of under-completed and 
underfunded projects; addressing the “incentives and motivation” issue 
pertaining to the civil service; a mind-set change to ensure a focus on the 
“little decisions” as much as on the “big decisions”; and, better information 
flows (PRSP, 2005: xviii). 
 
None of these efforts is possible without an efficient, able, energetic, dynamic and 
effective administrative apparatus capable of operationalising and implementing the 
necessary reforms. M. Mahbubur Rahman Morshed makes an interesting comment 
about administrative reform efforts in Bangladesh. 
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[I]t is an irony that only bureaucrats—whether present or former—were 
included as chairmen and members in all the commissions and committees 
which were constituted by the government from time to time for examining, 
evaluating and improving public administration who used those commissions 
and committees only to safeguard their own interest. (Morshed, 1997: 130) 
 
This, in fact, is the main reason for the lack of innovative ideas in the administrative 
system of Bangladesh. Bureaucrats, in general, are reluctant to change. A review of 
the literature suggests that, so far, they have succeeded either to resist any reform 
agenda or to create impediments in implementing it. Resistance has two phases. First, 
power and authority to make the reform successful is concentrated in the hands of 
bureaucrats and, second, after taking control, they adopt a non-cooperative or a go-
slow approach. A study conducted by Monem on the privatization experience of the 
country provides a classic example. From the beginning of the privatization 
experience, “successive regimes placed enormous responsibility and authority for 
privatizing enterprises in the hands of a group of senior bureaucrats” (Monem, 2006: 
114). A number of bureaucrats supported the privatization policy but their main 
interest was “to get a share of the pie.” Public corporation bureaucrats always resist 
privatization, as there is every possibility of losing power and authority. By maintaining 
strong connections with the ministerial bureaucrats, who could not get a share of the pie, 
the impediment is created. The impediment is manifest by “non-co-operation or slow 
official actions on privatization affairs” (Ibid.: 123).   
 
Reforms that threaten the status of the civil service face even more resistance. For 
example, the Rules of Business followed in the civil service of Bangladesh was 
initiated in 1975. Though it has been revised, the bureaucracy has so far been 
successful in resisting any effort that can pose a threat to its centralized character 
(Siddiqui, 2006: 118-19). The same response has met the decentralization agendas of 
various governments. Whatever the method used, the bureaucracy has successfully 
created impediments to ensuring people’s participation (Morshed, 1997: 166-68).  
 
What, then, explains the successful implementation of the “one stop” payment system, 
e-governance and LGED? First of all, the “one stop” payment system and e-
governance were not a threat to the elitist and authoritative nature of the civil 
servants. Second, in case of LGED, people’s participation was ensured, as the 
International Development Agency monitored the entire project. Therefore, 
implementation of innovative ideas is possible if there is a pressure from the 
development partners. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other 
development institutions are making comments and providing concrete suggestions 
for public sector reform in Bangladesh. The government is feeling the pressure and so 
are the civil servants. It will be interesting to observe how the civil service copes with 
these demands for reform. 
 
Recruitment 
 
States that endured the colonial experience exhibit similar social class structures and 
have bureaucracies that reflect this class structure. During colonial times, the 
bureaucracy was simply an apparatus of the colonial lords. For their own purposes, 
the colonial powers placed special emphasis on making the bureaucracy an elite and 
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organized force totally alienated from the society. At independence, the bureaucracy 
remained a strong and highly developed state apparatus (Alavi, 1972: 59-62).  
 
In the British colonial period, access to civil service was limited to young university 
graduates belonging to the rich upper class. This pattern continued during the 
Pakistani period. After liberation, the Bangladesh constitution established that equal 
opportunity for all citizens should be the guiding principle in public service 
recruitment. Based on the constitutional provisions, the government also made special 
arrangements—a quota system—to create special opportunities for disadvantaged 
groups. However, no system was developed to regulate the induction of personnel at 
the base level of the higher civil service until 1977: it was regulated by ad hoc 
arrangements. In 1977 and 1979, the Public Service Commission, the constitutional 
body, conducted two superior post examinations to recruit candidates through open 
competition. As per recommendation of Pay and Services Commission, 1977, 14 main 
cadres (later increased to 29) were created. The first Bangladesh civil service 
examination was held in 1982 following the Bangladesh Civil Service (Recruitment) 
rules, 1981(Zafarullah, 1988: 130-33). 
 
According to the current recruitment policy, there are three means of recruitment: 
direct recruitment—open competitive examinations; promotion and transfer; and 
direct lateral recruitment (Report of Bangladesh Public Service Commission, 
2004:12). Class I Officers (the key decision makers and roughly 8% of all civil 
servants) are recruited directly by the PSC through an open competitive examination 
into 29 cadres and other government services. The Ministry of Establishment gathers 
staffing requirements from ministries and government bodies to determine the number 
of new officers to be recruited. It then advises the PSC to conduct the competitive 
examination and finalise the list of potential recruits. Finally, the Ministry of 
Establishment appoints officers from the list supplied by the PSC.  
 
Recruitment follows the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules of 1981. While 
Bangladesh largely follows a closed entry system, there is a provision for 10% 
“lateral” entry into the civil service to more senior grades from outside the service. In 
addition, the PSC is required to reserves appointment of Class I posts according to the 
following quotas:  
 
30% reserved for freedom fighters or the children of freedom fighters 
10% reserved for women 
5% reserved for tribal groups 
10% reserved for different districts (based on district population density) 
 
This quota system leaves only 45 percent of the posts for recruitment to be filled 
following a merit-based open competitive system. The current quotas were introduced 
in March 1997 (DFID, 2004). Previously, the 30-percent reserved quota was for 
freedom fighters only; it did not include their children. Since 1987 the PSC has 
recommended modifying the quota system (Ali, 2004:125). The Public 
Administration Reform Commission of 2000 also proposed gradual abolishment of 
this system, and development partners like World Bank and ADB concur. The 
government recently decided that in case of 30-percent reservation for the children of 
freedom fighters, if suitable candidates are not found, the posts could be filled by 
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recruitment through merit (Report of Bangladesh Public Service Commission, 
2004:13-14). 
 
Recruitment Examination System 
When the open competitive examination for BCS recruitment started in 1982, each 
candidate had to sit for an exam of 1600 marks total. In 1984, the total marks were 
reduced to 900. However, in 1985, the Public Service Commission (PSC) decided to 
increase the total marks again. Since then, each candidate had to participate in an 
exam of 1000 marks: 500 marks for compulsory subjects, 300 marks for optional 
subjects and 200 marks for viva voce test. The five compulsory subjects were Bangla, 
English, Bangladesh Affairs, International Affairs and General Mathematics and 
Science with 100 marks for each. A candidate selected three exams from 64 optional 
subjects with 100 marks each. The marks distribution for technical and functional 
cadres had no optional subject exams: instead, 300 marks were based on the 
candidate’s academic attainments (Public Service Commission Report, 2004:17).  
In 1998, the PSC initiated a reform of the BCS written examination system to match 
better contemporary needs. In 2004, the PSC decided to introduce the new BCS 
examination in 2006 with the 27th BCS exam. Now all candidates sit for 900 marks of 
written examinations in five subjects and 100 marks viva voce. The distribution of 
marks is as follows: 200 for Bangla, 200 for English, 200 for Bangladesh Affairs, 100 
for International Affairs, 100 for General Science and Technology, 100 for 
Mathematics and IQ, and 100 for viva voce. Professional and technical cadres have 
the following distribution of marks: 100 for Bangla, 200 for English, 200 for 
Bangladesh Affairs, 100 for International Affairs, 100 for Mathematics and IQ, 200 
for academic results and 100 for viva voce. (The Daily Star, August 11, 2004).  
Although the process of direct recruitment is conducted by the PSC, all appointments 
to the senior civil service (deputy secretary and above) are made by the Prime 
Minister upon the advice of the Superior Selection Board which is comprised of the 
Principal Secretary, the Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary of Law Ministry, the 
Secretary of Home Ministry, and the Secretary of Establishment Ministry (DFID, 
2004). 
 
Problems in the Recruitment System   
In case of direct recruitment, the literature suggests that the examination system, even 
the modified one, is sufficient to bring meritorious personnel into the public service. It 
does not test for creative thinking and analytical ability. Studies show that the civil 
service examination is not as tough and competitive as it was during the British or 
Pakistani periods. The BSC exam has become so easy that most candidates memorize 
study guides, write the answers mechanically and pass. The question papers prepared 
for the BCS exam are not rich enough to identify deserving candidates for class I 
positions.  
Serious allegations such as the leakage of question papers have been made against the 
Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC had to cancel the 24th BCS preliminary 
test due to the alleged leakage of question papers (The Daily Star, August 11, 2003). 
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The PSC has not yet to solve this problem or perception, as allegations of leakage 
continue to emerge at every preliminary and written test. The persistent concern about 
leakage as well as politicization damages the credibility of the public service 
examination process and is causing meritorious students to reconsider pursuing public 
sector careers.  
If this problem continues, civil service jobs may lose their prestige. Because of 
loopholes in recruitment procedures, a large number of incompetent candidates have 
entered the civil service and the outcome has been embarrassing for the country. The 
country director of the Department for International Development (DFID), David 
Wood at a press briefing during a two-day long conference titled “Asia-2015: 
Promoting Growth, Ending Poverty” questioned the capability of Bangladesh civil 
servants in implementing foreign aid projects  (The Daily Star, July 17, 2006). A 
senior PSC member confessed that the performance of the civil service is sometimes 
embarrassing for the government as some civil servants lack basic command of 
English language and communication skills (The Financial Express, October 29, 
2005). The increase in contractual recruitment in the civil service may also reflect the 
competency problem: the government often has no alternative but to contract because 
of the insufficient number of skilled public servants. 
The problem in the recruitment process is two-fold. The first is structural and includes 
the lengthy procedure and the inadequate salary structure. The second is political and 
corruption-related; this includes leakage of question papers and political consideration 
on the part of the political parties in recruitment. Neither problem is too difficult or 
complex to solve. Donors are willing to fund reform projects because development 
assistance is more likely to succeed if there is an effective administrative apparatus. 
This is why development partners often emphasize capacity building of civil servants. 
With this in mind, Management At The Top (MATT) has been introduced as training 
policy with the assistance of DFID. Some 2,000 civil servants at the level of senior 
assistant secretary and above are to receive intensive training under this program, 
which will be an "important building block for incremental administrative reform" 
(The Financial Express, October 29, 2005).  
Politicization of Bureaucracy 
The national government that came into power immediately after independence tried 
hard to reform the colonial bureaucracy. It openly showed its antipathy towards the 
elitist civil service of Pakistan and took measures to eliminate elitism and make the 
bureaucracy a dynamic organization. To reduce the power of the generalist civil 
servants, academicians were appointed to the highest posts of the civil service. This 
effort made the bureaucracy uncomfortable; the government later withdrew from the 
reform efforts, but the bureaucracy remained in a vulnerable position (Hakim, 1991:9-
14). But within a few years, assassination of leaders, coups and counter-coups 
disturbed Bangladesh; this instability created an opportunity for the relatively 
bureaucracy to regain its previous status.  
 
In 1972, Alavi commented that there was a chance that in the future Bangladesh 
might come under military rule and new bureaucratic-military oligarchy would then 
come into existence (Alavi, 1972: 80-81). This is exactly what happened after 1975. 
In spite of some efforts made by politicians, no viable, transparent or accountable 
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political institution developed and, in its absence, an alliance between the civil and 
military bureaucracies emerged. From 1975 to 1990 there was military rule, in various 
forms, in Bangladesh. The military authority needed the support of civil bureaucracy; 
and the civil bureaucracy strengthened its position in return for supporting the military 
regime. The civil bureaucracy’s power continued to expand because its 
“organizational strength and managerial skills” were essential for supporting 
successive governments. Thus, the bureaucracy attained considerable autonomy.  
 
When Bangladesh decided to embrace a democratic system in 1991, the bureaucracy 
found its autonomy challenged. It appeared that political patronage and favoritism 
threatened to erode the cohesiveness and unity of the civil service. Eventually, the 
bureaucracy found out a new strategy to overcome this “problem”. It was done in two 
ways. First, after retirement, senior bureaucrats began “infiltrating the ranks of 
politicians”. Second, the bureaucracy allowed itself to be politicized. The political 
parties did not prevent this, as the bureaucracy’s support was necessary to run and 
manage the country. This gave rise to massive politicization and to an erosion of the 
traditional values of public service neutrality held by the bureaucracy. (Haque and 
Rahman, 2003: 404).  
The politicization of bureaucracy is not unique to Bangladesh. For example, a debate 
about the politicization of bureaucracy emerged in the UK during the time of 
Margaret Thatcher when Sir John Hoskins stated that moderate politicization at the 
higher level of the bureaucracy would help the government to implement its policy 
more effectively (Ali, 2004:15-16). In one way or another, politicization is present in 
the administration of almost every developed country. It exists to allow the political 
leadership—those who are elected and the advisors they hire or appoint directly—to 
coordinate with the administrative leadership, senior career civil servants. 
Reorganizing ministries and transferring selected senior civil servants are political 
actions, but they can be justified or rationalized as enhancing efficiency and can be 
considered positive or allowable politicization. In this discussion we focus on the 
negative aspect of politicization. It exists when personnel management decisions like 
transfer, promotion, and contractual recruitment depend not on quality and efficiency 
but on the person’s loyalty to a certain political party: the subversion of merit and 
seniority standards damages the civil service as an institution. 
The democratic era in Bangladesh has witnessed massive politicization but it was not 
to gain efficiency and increase effectiveness. Rather, the primary emphasis was 
placed on recruiting “party men bureaucrats” irrespective of their qualifications. In 
first five years of democracy—1991 to 1996—the BNP ruled the country. 
Politicization appeared in various forms including the placement of party loyalists in 
important civil service positions. Also, the government tried to manipulate the 
recruitment process of the civil service by letting in candidates with links to student 
wing of the party (Zafarullah, 1997). On February 8, 1992, the government decided to 
promote as many as 654 officials, which created a lot of controversy (The Daily 
Shangbad, June 2, 2000). Further, from 1991 to 1996, the government issued orders of 
forced retirement of at least 51 civil servants; most of them were never shown any 
reason for this order (Karim, 1996: 39).    
 
After coming to power in 1996, the Awami League continued the process of 
politicization. A number of senior civil servants, in 1996, were directly involved in a 
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movement to remove a democratically elected government. The Awami League, the 
party that came to power due to that movement decided to reward to those civil 
servants by including one of them in their ministry and by promoting the others 
(Haque and Rahman, 2003: 411-12). In 2001, the government decided to promote as 
many as 355 officials depriving many competent officials of promotion, as the 
government was not sure about their political loyalty—a violation of seniority (The 
daily Prothom Alo, January 14, 2001). Moreover, the amount of contractual 
recruitment increased significantly through 2000: 174 civil servants were recruited on 
contractual basis (The Daily Shangbad, August 8, 2000). 
In 2001, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party formed the government and has since tried 
to maintain firm control over the bureaucracy by making it highly politicized. The 
government has created a new record by appointing 978 officials as “Officer on 
Special duty” (OSD) (The Daily Janakantha, May 21, 2006). Allegedly, promotion 
decisions are no longer being made according to seniority or merit; rather importance 
is given to party loyalty; this is causing a severe damage to the morale of the civil 
servants. Furthermore, the number of contractual appointments has also increased and 
most of these appointments, and extensions of contracts, are being made on the basis 
of political allegiance. It is alleged that most of the secretaries and additional 
secretaries getting contractual appointment, or extension of contracts, are inclined 
either toward BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami (The Daily Star, July 17, 2006). 
It is reported that the government has initiated a new process of politicization. With 
the consent of Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), an unofficial cell was created to make 
sure that no civil servant who is or was sympathetic to Awami League is promoted 
(Khan, 2003: 402-03). The SSB (Superior Selection Board) is now dysfunctional. The 
decisions are made by the PMO and the SSB’s only duty is to approve the list 
supplied by the PMO (The Daily Janakantha, May 5, 2006). A study conducted by the 
World Bank demonstrated that politicians are indeed influencing the BCS recruitment 
process (Mukherjee et al., 2001). 
The newspaper account below documents the pervasive politicization of the civil 
service. Promotion should be according to seniority. However, seniority is being 
circumvented for political purposes, thus ‘depriving’ civil servants of due promotion:   
“On June 13, 2002, 170 were promoted to the post of Joint Secretary depriving 200. On February 10 & 
16, 2003, 493 were promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary depriving 322. On August 27, 2003, 97 
were promoted to the post of Additional Secretary depriving 104. On August 27, 2003, 49 were 
promoted to the post of Joint Secretary depriving 277. On June 15, 2004, 84 were promoted to the post 
of Joint Secretary depriving 78. On February 15, 2005, 18 were promoted to the post of Secretary 
depriving 5. On March 5, 2005, 61 were promoted to the post of depriving 31. On April 21, 2005, 327 
were promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary depriving 50. On January 26, 2006, 378 Senior 
Assistant Secretaries were promoted to the post of Deputy Secretary depriving around 200 others. 
Interestingly enough, 39 Additional Secretaries were reported to have been promoted to the highest 
rank of Secretary. Seniority was alleged to have been violated in the cases of 14 civil servants and 30 
civil servants were alleged to have been promoted to the highest rank of Secretary in only 3 years.  As 
far as promotion is concerned, the current government has promoted 153 Deputy Secretaries to the post 
of Joint Secretary as lately as 13 July 2006 depriving around 100 eligible officers along with 5 
Additional Secretaries promoted to the post of Secretary.” 
Source: Bangladesh Observer, ‘Government’s Institution-Destruction Spree’, 22 July 
2006. 
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This massive politicization has an adverse effect on the overall performance of the 
civil service. Since the return to democratic rule, the bureaucracy has redefined its 
role to defend its autonomy and character. An alliance has been created in which the 
bureaucrats let themselves be politicized. There are certain rules and regulations that 
govern the civil service of Bangladesh. One is The Government Servants (Conduct) 
Rules, 1979, which regulates the terms and conditions of service in the service of the 
Republic. The section 25 of this rule states: 
(1) No Government servant shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated 
with, any political party or, any organization affiliated to any political party, 
or shall take part, or assist, in any manner, in any political activity in 
Bangladesh or abroad; 
(2) No Government servant shall permit any person dependent on him for 
maintenance or under his care or control to take part in or in anyway assist, 
any movement or activity which is, or tends directly or indirectly to be 
subversive of Government as by law established in Bangladesh. 
(3) No Government servant shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his 
influence in connection with or take part in any election to a legislative body, 
whether in Bangladesh or elsewhere: Provided that a Government servant 
who is qualified to vote at such election may exercise his right to vote; but if 
he does so, he shall give no indication of the manner in which he proposes to 
vote or has voted (The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979).  
 
Many civil servants, as well as the government, have started to ignore these rules. A 
number of civil servants are directly participating in political activities by seeking 
nomination to participate in the upcoming (2007) elections. For instance, a civil 
servant appointed on contractual basis after his retirement, has been involved in active 
politics and is projecting himself as a candidate of the ruling party. This constitutes an 
offence under the service rule. It has been noted, that after having obtained 
assurances, he will be given an election ticket from the BNP; the person in question 
started taking up development projects in a constituency and also started an election 
campaign showing total disregard to the discipline of the Civil Service (The 
Bangladesh Observer, May 24, 2006). Another allegation has been made against a 
divisional special judge pointing out that while on the job, he “has been participating 
in many public meetings of the ruling party BNP” introducing himself as a BNP 
candidate for Member of Parliament (MP) in the next election (The Bangladesh 
Observer, February 14, 2006). These illustrate just a few instances of a broader 
pattern: the problem of negative politicization has become very common in last fifteen 
years.  
 
II Perception of Bangladesh Civil Service: Analysis of Primary Data  
 
The conventional view is that the Bangladesh civil service attracts the country’s bright 
meritorious students and cultivates an elitism that makes civil servants apathetic to the 
needs of citizens, especially poor. Our review of the existing literature indicates that 
the conventional wisdom no longer fits the facts: the civil service is losing its appeal 
as the best career choice for many able candidates. The two major problems discussed 
in the first part of the paper—defective recruitment and politicization—have 
contributed to the declining status and appeal of civil service careers.  
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Our primary research attempts to understand the impact of faulty recruitment 
procedures and rapid politicization on the status of civil service in general. It also 
explores the competition between public and private sector jobs. The research 
questions that we have examined are: Are bright recent graduates from public and 
private universities still interested in joining the civil service? If not, what are the 
reasons? If they still want to join the civil service, what factors make the civil service 
an attractive career option? What do current civil servants and prospective civil 
servants think about the question pattern of BCS recruitment exams? Is the 
recruitment process sufficient to select the best candidates? Are the status and power 
of the civil servants declining? What do civil servants and prospective candidates 
think about politicization of the bureaucracy? Do civil servants still play the dominant 
role in designing and implementing policies or, have other actors or forces displaced 
it?   
 
Our survey instrument is a semi-structured questionnaire consisting of both open-
ended and close-ended questions. While our primary focus is on the perceptions of 
prospective candidates, we also examine whether entry-level and mid-level civil 
servants share similar perceptions. This part of the paper analyses the qualitative data 
obtained through interviews with mid-level and entry-level civil servants and potential 
BCS recruits. 
 
 
Table 1: Demographic Data 
 
Age Range Sex 
Respondents 
20-25 26-30 31-35 35+ Male Female 
Total 
Prospective 
Candidates 28 (56%) 21 (42%) 1 (2%)  27 (54%) 23 (46%) 50 
Entry-level Civil 
servants  8 (40%) 12 (60%)  16 (80%) 4 (20%) 20 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants   2 (13%) 13 (87%) 13 (87%) 2 (13%) 15 
Total and 
Percentage 
28 
(33%) 
29 
(34%) 
15 
(18%) 
13 
(15%) 
56 
(66%) 
29 
(34%) 
85 
(100%) 
 
 
Table one reports the demographic characteristics of our interviewees. Almost all of 
our potential BCS candidates are below 30 years of age. The entry-level officers—
those with less than five years of service—are no older than 35 years of age and mid-
level civil servants —those with five or more years of service—are mostly older than 
35 years of age. We did not consciously try to keep an equal male-female ratio when 
selecting our interviewees. Given the time constraints and lack of availability of the 
civil servants to interview, we followed a snowball method in interviewing willing 
and available officers. Nevertheless, in the end we found that we have more than 80 
percent male respondents among the serving civil servants. This reflects that fact that 
the representation of women in civil service of Bangladesh is very low. According to 
UNDP’s Human Development Report, 2005, the percentage of women administrators 
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and managers in Bangladesh is only 8.5. However, we tried to ensure better gender 
representation when interviewing potential candidates.  
 
Change in Society’s Attitude Regarding Civil Service Jobs 
 
Society is a complex system in which people from different classes and educational 
and occupational backgrounds interact. In a modern state, people from all walks of 
life interact with civil servants. Hence, to determine whether a change has occurred in 
society’s perception about civil service is not so easy. However, we have tried to find 
out is what actually comes into a citizen’s mind when they hear the word “civil 
service”. Haque described bureaucracy in Bangladesh as an effective tool of 
governance (Haque, 1995). Do the citizens think so?  
 
Table 2: Change in Society’s Attitude 
 
 
Change in society’s attitude towards civil service 
Respondents 
Positive Change Negative Change No Change 
Total 
Prospective 
Candidates 5 (10%) 43 (86%) 2 (4%) 50 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 5 (25%) 11 (55%) 4 (20%) 20 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 5 (33%) 7 (47%) 3 (20%) 15 
Total and percentage 15 (18%) 
61 
(72%) 
9 
(11%) 
85 
(100%) 
 
We have found that both the prospective and serving civil servants perceive that a 
change has occurred in society’s attitude towards the civil service. The change is not 
positive. More importantly, we have discovered a high degree of dissatisfaction 
among the prospective candidates. They described the Bangladesh civil service as a 
corrupt, politicized and an over-centralized organization where getting things done is 
almost impossible. In 1997, Zafarullah pointed out that the civil service is over-
centralized, unaccountable and inefficient. The prospective candidates agree with this 
statement. While being interviewed, one job seeker showed his disgust about civil 
service by describing it as “worthless”. Widespread corruption seems to be “the new 
feather in the cap”. Civil service to prospective candidates is “absolutely corrupt and 
politicized.”  
 
Most of the entry-level civil servants agree with this view. They agree that people 
now “show less respect to the civil servants”. Nonetheless, some of them actually 
think the other way. One of them commented, “Well, it is the digital age. People get 
more information and they are more conscious. Their consciousness and the pressure 
of globalization have actually forced the civil service to be more citizen-oriented.” 
They opined that civil service no longer poses an “elitist” character and thus people 
can rely on them more.  
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However, the mid-level civil servants’ opinion differs on this issue as one-third of 
them believes that society’s attitude has been changed positively towards civil service. 
This supports the idea that the civil service of Bangladesh is more or less a closed 
system as slightly more than half of the mid-level officers perceive either that the 
change has been positive or that this has been no change.   
   
What is the most Powerful Group in Society? 
 
Because of the colonial heritage, Bangladeshis conventionally believe that civil 
servants are very powerful. During the British colonial period, access to civil service 
was limited to brilliant university graduates belonging to the rich upper class. The 
pattern did not change much during the Pakistani era. However, we found that most of 
our respondents do not perceive a positive change in society’s attitude towards civil 
service, the next question that we asked was: “Who do you think of as the most 
powerful group in society?” 
 
Table 3: the most Powerful Group in Society 
 
Respondents Politicians Bureaucrats Both Politicians and bureaucrats 
A growing nexus 
between politicians 
and Businessmen 
Total 
Prospective 
Candidates 27 (54%) 17 (34%) 5 (10%) 1 (2%) 50 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 10 (50%) 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 7 (35%) 20 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 8 (53%) 3 (20%) 1 (7%) 3 (20%) 15 
Total and 
percentage 
45 
(53%) 
22 
(26%) 
7 
(8%) 
11 
(13%) 
85 
(100%) 
 
We have found out that civil servants as well as potential civil servants do not think 
that bureaucrats are most powerful group in society. Politicians are now considered as 
the most powerful group in the society; clearly, civil servants are perceived to be 
losing their influence in political and administrative processes. In an interview, one 
retired civil servant (CSP) said, “Well, the truth is that the present day civil servants 
are not courageous enough to take a stand. For instance, during my time as the 
secretary for the Ministry of Health, I had to take certain measures that made the 
politicians quite unhappy. They complained to the Prime Minister and at the end of 
the day I came out being a successful civil servant.” The mid-level and entry-level 
civil servants do not deny that their status is declining. However, one entry-level civil 
servant made an interesting comment: “Yes, that is true. A lot of heroic stories are 
heard about our predecessors but the fact is they did not have to work under so much 
political pressure.” To some mid-level civil servants, this situation is quite natural as 
the form of government is democratic. “Let’s face it,” one of them commented, “it is a 
democracy and they (politicians) are people’s representative.” 
 
An interesting point to note here is though the prospective candidates earlier opined 
that the society’s attitude is negative about civil service, a good number of them 
(34%) still considers civil servants as the most powerful group. Another important 
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issue that our research has pointed out is that a new group is emerging—a nexus is 
growing between the politicians and businessmen and in the near future they may 
become the most important actors in determining policy decisions. To a number of 
entry-level civil servants, this will happen eventually. “They (businessmen) have the 
money and they (politicians) have the power, when these two things match, anything 
can happen.” However, to our respondents politicians are the most powerful group 
and they have a certain extent of control even to determine who will join the civil 
service. 
 
Perception of Recruitment Process 
 
After Bangladesh decided to embrace a democratic system in 1991, political leaders 
started taking control over the bureaucracy (Haque et al., 2003). The situation took an 
important turn after the “Janatar Mancha” movement initiated by the civil servants in 
1996. Since then, the political party in power tried to prevent repetitions of such 
movements. The immediate impact was upon the recruitment process. Thus, we asked 
the respondents what they think about the recruitment process of Bangladesh Civil 
Service. 
 
Table 4: Perception about Recruitment Process 
 
Do You Think That The Present Recruitment Process may be corrupt? 
Respondents 
Yes No Negligible No Comments 
Total 
Prospective 
Candidates 41 (82%) 7 (14%) 2 (4%) 0 50 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 15 (75%) 3 (15%) 2 (10%) 0 20 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 5 (33%) 6 (40%) 3 (20%) 1 (7%) 15 
Total and 
percentage 
61 
(72%) 
16 
(19%) 
7 
(8%) 
1 
(1%) 
85 
(100%) 
 
 
For the purpose of this study, recruitment process means entire procedures of civil 
service examinations except the question pattern. To both prospective candidates and 
entry-level civil servants, the recruitment process is highly corrupt. While 
interviewed, a prospective candidate admitted that he had actually bribed a viva board 
member to make sure that he could get the job. Leakage of question papers has 
become common and one prospective candidate said, “I actually got a suggestion 
before the preliminary test consisting of only 90 questions. When I saw the question 
paper, I realized about 95% of them had come from that so-called suggestion.” While 
the current environment is producing a negative perception, the mid-level civil 
servants interviewed have yet to realize this. Although one third of them agreed that 
the recruitment process is corrupt, for 60% of them the process is either quite all right 
or the scope of corruption is negligible. 
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Political pressure is undoubtedly one of the reasons behind this extensive negative 
perception regarding civil service recruitment. We find that roughly half of the civil 
servants interviewed identify the appointment and conduct of the PSC chair and PSC 
members as responsible for the corruption of recruitment. One retired CSP officer 
commented, “as long as the senior bureaucrats headed the PSC, the recruitment 
process was fair. They knew what they were doing. But, you tell me how a university 
professor from a pure science discipline understands who we need to recruit for civil 
service.” More over, in our discussion with mid-level and entry-level officers, we 
found that, to them, the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the Public 
Service Commission based on their political loyalty is the seed of all misdeeds. They 
do not play an adequate role and sometimes they join the party in power by 
infiltrating corruption using their influence. “They are greedy,” one of the entry-level 
civil servants remarked, “Besides, as they are politically appointed they know they 
can get away with that.” However, prospective candidates do not think this is the main 
problem. In fact, many of them do not know much about what the PSC is and have no 
clear idea what the PSC does.  
 
Table 5: Sources of Corruption 
 
Reasons behind Corruption in Civil Service Recruitment* 
Respondents 
Political 
Pressure 
Nature of Appointment & 
Role Played by PSC 
Members 
No Idea Others 
Prospective 
Candidates 45 (90%) 5 (10%) 0 0 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 7 (35%) 12 (60%) 5 (25%) 5 (25%) 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 3 (20%) 5 (33%) 6 (40%) 4 (27%) 
Total and 
Percentage 
55 
(65%) 
22 
(26%) 
11 
(13%) 
9 
(11%) 
 
 (*Multiple answers were allowed; thus percentages can sum to more than 100%) 
Perception of Question Pattern 
A survey conducted by Habib Zafarullah in 1988 revealed that the performance of a 
major portion of the candidates in the recruitment examination is unsatisfactory as far 
as their intellect and knowledge are concerned. The structure of the examination, it 
seems, aims at obtaining university graduates, irrespective of the subject they study. 
The study concludes that the present structure and nature of the BCS exam tends to 
favor the “impetuous” and “shallow knowledged” (Zafarullah, 1988:133-35).  
In our interviews, we found that the introduction of a new question pattern in written 
exams is one of the few success stories of the PSC in recent times. We have already 
discussed the present examination system and the changes that have been brought in 
question pattern. We asked respondents what they thought about this new question 
pattern. 
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Table 6: Perception about Question Pattern 
What Do You Think About New Question Pattern Introduced 
In BCS Exam? 
Respondents 
Improved & 
Adequate 
Improved but Not 
Entirely Adequate 
Entirely 
Inadequate No Idea 
Total 
 
Prospective 
Candidates 27 (54%) 0 19 (38%) 4 (8%) 50 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 11 (55%) 3 (15%) 5 (25%) 1 (5%) 20 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 1 (7%) 3 (20%) 9 (60%) 2 (13%) 15 
Total and 
Percentage 
39 
(46%) 
6 
(7%) 
33 
(39%) 
7 
(8%) 
85 
(100%) 
 
The prospective candidates and the entry-level civil servants are quite happy about the 
recent change in question pattern. The mid-level civil servants still think that the 
question pattern is entirely inadequate; however, we found out that they made this 
comment without actually knowing about the change. Instead, their comments were 
based on their own examination experience. For instance, one of them said that to 
improve the question pattern, “there should be less marks in the viva voce test and 
provision of optional subject in the written test should be stopped.” In fact, PSC had 
already made both changes, but the mid-level officers were not aware of it. 
 
What Motivates and what De-motivates Potential Candidates?  
 
Considering all these things, from negatives such as politicization and corrupt 
recruitment practices, to positives such as the new question pattern, we have tried to 
find the core factors that may de-motivate future candidates in joining the civil 
service. We find three core factors: inadequate salary, faulty exam procedure and 
existing bureaucratic culture. 
                                                                                                                                                        
We have found that there is a difference between the inside-the-job view and the 
outside-the job view. For prospective candidates the main de-motivating factor is the 
faulty exam procedure whereas according to mid and entry-level civil servants both 
inadequate salary and job environment play a vital role in discouraging one from 
sitting for the BSC exam.  
 
It is likely that once inside the civil service the faulty exam procedure does not seem 
so significant. However, to the prospective candidates, it is an important de-
motivating factor. It is striking though how evenly divided the responses are among 
the three factors. For civil servants, Exam ceases to matter, and their responses are 
relatively evenly divided between Salary (28 responses from 35 interviewees) and Job 
(25 response from 35 interviewees).  
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Table 7: De-motivating factors 
 
De-motivating factors in case of sitting for BCS exam*   
Respondents 
 Inadequate Salary 
Faulty Exam 
Procedure Job Environment 
Prospective 
Candidates 20 (40%) 22 (44%) 18 (36%) 
Entry-level Civil 
servants 16 (80%) 1 (5%) 16 (80%) 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 12 (80%) 1 (7%) 9 (60%) 
Total and Percentage 48 (56%) 
24 
(28%) 
43 
(51%) 
 
(*Multiple answers were allowed; thus percentages can sum to more than 100%.) 
 
Faulty exam procedure includes the lengthiness of the entire exam, the leakage of 
question pattern, politicization in case of recruitment, an unaccountable viva board, 
etc. One prospective candidate said, “When I was in the exam hall scanning through 
the question during the preliminary exam, I looked around and found that almost 
everybody had got the question earlier. It was so frustrating. Then I decided even if I 
passed the preliminary test, I would not sit for written test,” and, “well, I passed in the 
preliminary test and that is the end. I will never sit for BCS again.” On the other hand, 
another prospective candidate actually enjoyed the preliminary test and written exam. 
However, “the real horror started when I faced the viva board. All sort of political 
questions were asked and when they found out that my political view is different from 
theirs, I realized that that was end of journey for me. Later, I came to know that I was 
rather lucky. One of my friends was asked why she did not use scarf to cover her head 
and whether she knew the Niyot of prayers. That was too much for her. She got 
herself out of the room and now we both are private sector employees.” Almost all of 
them agreed that exam procedure is too lengthy. A few of the prospective candidates 
supported the present recruitment procedure. To them, “it is the most cost effective 
way to select the best.” An entry-level civil servant agreed with that, “It is the best the 
country can offer.” 
 
The three categories of respondents agreed that inadequate salary benefit is a major 
obstacle in joining the civil service. They also found the job environment too rigid to 
allow anyone to do something creative. “Taking initiative and coming up with 
creative ideas is not well appreciated,” commented one entry-level civil servant. 
 
A potentially positive finding is that despite of all its flaws, more than half of the 
bright meritorious students are still willing to sit for the BCS exam. They still 
consider civil service jobs as prestigious and attractive. “Whatever happens, civil 
service is civil service,” remarked one public university graduate. However, the 
private university students are not at all interested in joining the civil service. In fact, 
students coming from the private universities have little idea about the civil service of 
Bangladesh. Seventy percent of them admitted that they are not aware about the salary 
benefits provided by civil service and have no clear idea about the composition of the 
civil service or what it does. 
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Table 8: Civil Service as Career Choice (Public versus Private University 
Graduates)  
 
Will You Consider Sitting For BCS Exam? 
Respondents 
Yes, I Will May be I Will No, I Will Not 
 
 
Total 
Prospective 
Candidates (Public 
University) 
21 (52%) 8 (20%) 11 (28%) 40 
Prospective 
Candidates (Private 
University) 
2 (20%) 2 (20%) 6 (60%) 10 
Total and Percentage 23 (46%) 
10 
(20%) 
17 
(34%) 
50 
(100%) 
 
Another dimension is rural versus urban background. For meritorious students from 
urban areas, especially from the capital city, a job in Bangladesh civil service is no 
longer a lucrative career choice. To them, private sector jobs and doing business have 
become more attractive. To students from the suburbs or rural areas, however, civil 
service jobs have not lost their attraction.  
 
Table 9: Civil Service as Career Choice (Urban versus Rural Background) 
 
Will You Consider Sitting For BCS Exam?  
 
Respondents Yes, I Will May be I Will No, I Will Not 
 
 
Total 
Prospective Candidates 
(Coming from urban 
Area) 
8 (28%) 4 (14%) 17 (58%) 29 
Prospective Candidates 
Coming from rural Area) 15 (71%) 6 (29%) 0 21 
 
This new trend in career choice among job seekers may in the long run help the 
country in two ways. First, if the civil service becomes more representative of 
Bangladeshi demography (more officers coming from rural and suburban areas 
instead of big cities) it may help eliminate elitism that persists in the civil service. 
Eventually, the civil service may become dynamic and reliable and more connected to 
the pro-poor development agenda. Second, it may accelerate the bottom-up approach 
and the people’s voice may be more likely to be heard by the bureaucracy. 
 
Interestingly, though recent graduates willing to join the civil service have a positive 
outlook about civil service jobs, the opposite is not always true for the graduates who 
are reluctant to join the civil service. A good number of the latter possess a positive 
attitude about civil service as a career choice. Their reluctance centers on some 
institutional failures of the public sector, not on the relative attraction of the private 
sector. For example, if problems with the exam procedure were rectified (i.e., leakage 
of question paper, lengthy, politicized exam procedure), more than half of the 
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prospective candidates would consider civil service jobs as their first choice. 
Similarly, if civil service salary benefits were made equal to that of the private sector, 
then 60% of prospective candidates will sit for civil service jobs. According to one 
respondent, “If salary benefit is increased, I think everyone will go for civil service 
jobs.”   
 
So far, we have found a mixed picture. The most important finding is that, despite of 
all these problems, meritorious, bright students are still attracted to civil service jobs. 
The basic question is: What can the civil service offer that may attract the best 
candidate on the job market? We found a number of factors and of them the most 
important is job security. As a number of prospective candidates with working 
experience in private sector pointed out, “Job security is the main thing; if certain 
things were changed we would definitely go for public sector.” 
 
Table 10: Motivating factors 
 
Motivating factors for Joining Civil Service* 
 
 
 
Respondents 
 
Job 
Security Status/Power 
Salary 
Benefit 
Serving 
the 
nation 
Desire/Suggestion 
of Family 
Members 
No Idea About 
Civil Service/ 
No Comments 
Prospective 
Candidates 
(Public 
University) 
19 (48%) 6 (15%) 0 3 (8%) 0 12 (30%) 
Prospective 
Candidates 
(Private 
University) 
2 (20%) 4 (40%) 0 0 0 4 (40%) 
Entry-level 
Civil servants 9 (45%) 11 (55%) 0 7 (35%) 0 0 
Mid-level Civil 
Servants 5 (27%) 2 (14%) 0 0 6 (40%) 2 (14%) 
Total and 
Percentage 
35 
(41%) 
23 
(27%) 
0 
(0%) 
10 
(12%) 
6 
(7%) 
18 
(21%) 
 
(*Multiple answers were allowed; thus percentages can sum to more than 100%.) 
 
Job security has always been an important factor motivating people to join the civil 
service. Our data indicate that as a motivating factor its importance is actually 
increasing. Due to the “horror” stories of politicization or corruption, the status of the 
civil service is no longer the main determinant. Only 20% students think that at 
present the status that civil servants enjoy is sufficient to attract prospective 
candidates; Public university graduates have a more favorable evaluation of the status 
than private university graduates. An important point to consider is that the 
flourishing private sector may offer better salary and benefit package and innovative 
challenges, but it lacks job security. Many prospective employees prefer job security 
to challenge or competition.  
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The reason behind joining the civil service has also become more realistic or 
pragmatic. As society adopts an urban, capitalist structure, its impact is felt in various 
institutions, especially the oldest one, the family. Our research indicates that for mid-
level officials, choice of a career largely depended on guidance from family members. 
The younger, newly appointed officials are more individualistic. Family plays a role 
but the basic reasons behind joining the civil service, in their case, are the social status 
and recognition that civil service can still provide. On the other hand, for the students 
who are likely to join the civil service, the main reason is the job security that they 
can enjoy while performing their duties. In fact, from mid-level through entry-level to 
the prospective applicants of civil service, job security is the only factor that has never 
lost its importance.  
Conclusion 
Some politicization of the civil service is unavoidable and even desirable; but beyond 
this desirable level politicization can easily undermine the reputation and 
effectiveness of the administrative institutions of the state. The faulty civil service 
recruitment procedures and the degree of politicization described in this paper are 
evident to civil servants and university graduates considering careers in public 
administration. The primary research reported in this paper reveals that the status of 
the civil service has eroded and bright graduates are now less likely to pursue public 
service positions than in the past.   
To function properly the government needs to maintain an able and efficient 
workforce. To do so the government must ensure that the civil service remains an 
attractive career choice. Our interviews reveal that the recruitment process and civil 
service salaries diminish the competitiveness of a public service career relative to 
employment in the private or NGO sectors. The Sixth National Pay Scale (NPC VI) 
provides an entry-level class I officer only Tk. 6800 a month (The daily Star, May 20, 
2005).  Private sector starting salaries for a similarly qualified individual (university 
graduate) fall in the Tk. 18000-25000 range. The maximum basic pay, according to 
NPC VI, is only Tk. 24000. So, the prospects for advancement, in terms of pay, are 
limited in the civil service. The public sector does offer more job security and more 
favorable pension benefits than the private sector, but these are not sufficient to close 
the current salary gap. Improving public salaries may not be particularly difficult. It is 
largely a budgetary matter; it does not pose a threat to the status quo.  
The challenges are to reform the recruitment process, de-politicize the bureaucracy 
and ensure the civil service promotion system is not tainted. These reforms, if 
undertaken successfully, would place efficient and skilled personnel in the right 
positions and attract the best and brightest students to public service careers. There is 
a large difference between what is necessary and what can be achieved when it comes 
to the public administration and good governance in Bangladesh. We found in this 
paper that contemporary public administration is all about politics. Politicians and 
bureaucrats are the key actors in the management of bureaucracy. Both bureaucrats 
and politicians have their own interests to preserve.  
The standard bi-lateral game between the government (political leadership) and the 
bureaucracy (civil service, administrative leadership) is becoming increasingly 
complicated. First, politicization of the bureaucracy blurs the formerly crisp 
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distinction between government and administration. Second, other actors have entered 
the game: the private sector, development partners, and civil society organizations. 
The private sector desires an efficient bureaucracy that will facilitate, or at least not 
impede, the development of predictable working environment. But the private sector 
has become integrated into the political elite: this is the often-noted nexus between 
business and politics. With a politicized bureaucracy well-connected businesses may 
be content with obtaining public services or approvals through political rather than 
administrative means, and may therefore not be overly concerned about reform. But 
less well-connected businesses may advocate more transparency and predictability. 
Development partners and civil society advocate civil service reforms and a dynamic, 
“non-procrastinated” bureaucracy. Development partners are particularly influential 
because they can advance or withhold financing as an incentive for reform. 
With more players in the game, the game has changed. The government consists of 
the party in power and the bureaucracy. Both have their own interests to preserve, and 
often act as two different and opposed actors. With more players and pressures and 
increasing politicization politicians increasingly find bureaucrats as allies and together 
they resist the effective functioning of the government against the pressures of non-
governmental actors. The non-governmental actors—development partners, private 
sector, civil society, and NGOs—each assert pressure on the government. The 
government tries to pursue its agenda and resist pressure while sustaining support. 
When the pressures are in alignment, or at least not in direct opposition, a reform 
initiative can be implemented. The one stop utility bill payment service is an example; 
but such examples are rare. More common is non-alignment and opposition: the 
government either terminations or neutralizes reform initiatives. The Anti-Corruption 
Commission is a neutralized reform. Development partners, civil society and the 
private sector advanced the idea. The major political parties and the bureaucracy 
resisted. In the end, the government did create an Anti-Corruption Commission, 
giving the formal appearance of reform; but the Commission was design with no 
effective enforcement capacity, thus the substance of the reform was neutralized.  
Therefore to enact reforms, effective reforms, the interests of the major actors must be 
in alignment, otherwise reform will be prevented or neutralized. A challenge for the 
research community is to help devise reforms with incentives to ensure alignment and 
successful enactment. If the party in power has the wish, has the “will”, it can arrange 
for a fair recruitment system, which may again attract bright, meritorious students. If 
the party in power shows reluctance in bringing about the change, pressure may come 
from development partners or civil society. We are not saying that it will solve all the 
problems, but it can be a start. It can make the bureaucracy an efficient, innovative 
and dynamic one to respond to the needs of the society. We know from previous 
experiences that a capable bureaucracy can make things happen, can turn dreams into 
reality.  
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